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"The People Who Own the Country Ought to




In 1637, Rene Descartes published one of the great books of
intellectual history-Discourse on Methods.1 This book attempted
to lay the foundation for the philosophical tradition known as ra-
tionalism. It contained epistemological rules for arriving at "cer-
tain" truth. Descartes asserted that truth is derived from two
mental operations: intuition and deduction. Upon these indubita-
ble rocks would be built an edifice of knowledge enduring forever.
Had Descartes possessed political clout commensurate with
his intellectual prestige, and were he and his followers so inclined,
they might have founded something called the "Supreme Rational-
ist Council" designed to maintain the Cartesian purity of subse-
quent knowledge. Under such an overarching system, peer review
would have been the basic principle by which future scientific
knowledge was accepted or rejected, but if major questions of ap-
propriateness arose, the Council alone would have ruled on them.
The Council would have declared work deemed in violation of
rules set forth in the Discourse "unCartesian" and consigned it to
scientific limbo. The work, of course, would have to be inter-
preted, and such interpretations might have varied considerably
over time and with the composition of the Council. Some Council
members might have been more open than others, and some might
have possessed idiosyncratic reasons for voting for the publication
of papers with which they did not fully agree.
* Quoted in Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition 15-16
(1948).
** Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, Boise State University. B.A., East-
ern Michigan University, M.A., University of Toledo, Ph.D., Bowling Green State
University. I would like to thank my colleague, Professor A. Robert Corbin, for his
helpful critical review of this manuscript. I also acknowledge a debt of gratitude to
editors Tom Gallagher and Anne Johnson for their heroic efforts to help me to
come to terms with the legal system of footnoting.
1. See generally Rene Descartes, A Discourse of a Method for the Well Guid-
ing of Reason and the Discovery of Truth in the Sciences (1649).
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If such a Council existed, it would have effectively stifled sci-
entific progress by binding it to outmoded concepts. By making
science, or any other body of knowledge, conform to a set of rules
viewed as inviolable, it would have erected boundaries around
what is perforce an open-ended endeavor. Empiricism triumphed
over rationalism as a more useful epistemology in science because
it allowed for the writing and rewriting of the scientific "rule
book" by those who work by it. The only test of the "appropriate-
ness" of the rules of empiricism is how well they work in the fur-
therance of knowledge.
The value orientation of this article is consistent with
Michael Parenti's view that democracy, like science, is an open-
ended endeavor upon which "[o]ne should not try to impose, as a
precondition .... particular class relations, economic philosophies
or other substantive arrangements .. ..*"2 The drafters of the
United States Constitution imposed preconditions, however, and
they established a council of jurists drawn from the same class as
themselves to sanctify and protect those preconditions. The pre-
conditions set forth in the U.S. Constitution were the ideas of the
ruling class, and the Supreme Court has been the priesthood
which has interpreted and defended these ideas against heresy and
apostasy since its creation in 1789.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the existence of
ideological hegemony in the United States and to explore how the
Supreme Court has been instrumental in its establishment and
perpetuation. Given sociology's interest in the power of values,
morals, customs, and traditions to generate behavior, its lack of in-
terest in the role of the Supreme Court is puzzling. An extensive
search of the literature reveals no paper dealing with the concept
of hegemony in the United States that even mentions the Supreme
Court. Yet, it is this body which serves as gatekeeper, cultivator,
reinforcer, and legitimizer of the very values, morals, customs, and
traditions with which sociologists concern themselves.3
In an article characterizing the study of law as the "intellec-
tual stepchild" of sociology, 4 Talcott Parsons decried the sociologi-
cal neglect of law because "[l]aw is significant, above all, as an
2. Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few 61 (1977).
3. See Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 795 (1975). We note that as early as the mid 19th century Alexis de
Tocqueville wrote that "[s]carcely any political question arises in the United States
that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America 280 (Phillips Bradley ed. 1945).
4. See Talcott Parsons, Law as an Intellectual Stepchild, 47 Soc. Inquiry 11-58
(1977).
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institutional instrument of 'social control'." 5 The law as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court is important to an understanding of
social processes because it demands behavioral, if not attitudinal
and valuative, conformity. For Parsons, "[t]he focal point is that
the law of the state is binding in the sense that not only is compli-
ance defined as 'obligatory' but coercive sanctions are also
threatened or applied in case of noncompliance." 6 It is clear that
American 7 value orientations in such areas as slavery, abortion, so-
cial welfare legislation, pornography, and civil rights wax and
wane with Supreme Court decisions. Using National Opinion Re-
search Center data sets, David Barnum showed that when the
Court legitimizes formerly illegitimate practices (e.g., abortion),
public attitudinal support for those practices increases over time,
and when it strikes down a former practice as unconstitutional
(e.g., school prayer), public support for the practice tends to wane.8
A recent experimental study by the present author and A. Robert
Corbin found that a sample of older United States citizens were
significantly more likely to endorse a series of nine controversial
but hypothetical proposals when the source of those proposals was
given as the Supreme Court as opposed to the Congress or an unat-
tributed source. 9
Hegemony
The basic formulation of the idea of hegemony was presented
by Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels in their book The German Ide-
ology: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling
ideas; i.e., the class, which is the ruling material force of society, is
at the same time its ruling intellectual force." 10 Most authors who
5. Id. at 12.
6. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
7. The use of "America" or "American" to denote the United States and
United States citizens may be considered offensive to Canadians, Mexicans, and
Central and South Americans who also consider themselves Americans. However,
in the absence of a satisfactory synonym to fit all contexts I will continue to use
these terms with apologies to those whom it may offend.
8. See David Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Deci-
sion Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. Pol. 652-666. Barnum was con-
cerned with attitudes regarding birth control, segregated schools, women's roles,
interracial marriage, abortion, school prayer, preferential treatment, busing, and
homosexual activity. The Supreme Court has addressed all of these issues.
9. See A. Robert Corbin & Anthony Walsh, The U.S. Supreme Court and
Value Legitimacy: An Experimental Approach with Older Americans, 58 Soc. In-
quiry 75-86 (1988). We are aware that the Supreme Court does not make proposals,
but this distinction is not important to most people. The experimental demands of
consistency and parsimony dictated our use of the term "proposed" for each of the
experimental conditions.
10. Karl Marx & Fredrick Engels, The German Ideology 39 (R. Pascal ed. 1947).
Law and Inequality
have written about the concept have commented upon the paucity
of work in this area and feel that this in itself is "evidence of the
hegemonic process operating among intellectual workers.""l Such
circumstantial evidence points to, but does not demonstrate, the
existence of hegemony. Similar efforts have been made to docu-
ment the existence of hegemony in the United States by authors
who have simply deduced hegemonic dominance by quoting he-
gemony-like statements of supporters of the status quo or by sur-
mising it from either the relative absence of antiestablishment
ideas or the overwhelming presence of proestablishment ideas in
the schools or in the media.12
A more fruitful method of demonstrating the existence of he-
gemony in the United States is to examine the consequences one
might theoretically predict from its presence. If hegemony is a
way of interpreting reality which is diffused throughout all society,
coloring and informing everything it touches, then its conse-
quences should be empirically demonstrable in many areas of so-
cial life. It should be possible to prove that benefits and resources
in a society alleged to be hegemonic gravitate in a highly dispro-
portionate manner toward those who are deemed by such a system
to be most deserving of them. By the same measure, the share of
the national resource/benefit pie accruing to the "less deserving"
would be commensurably smaller, making for a rather large gap
between the "worthy" and the "unworthy."
Demonstrating the existence of resource/benefit gaps be-
tween the top and bottom segments of U.S. society in any great de-
tail is unnecessary. Such gaps exist in every society and are
patently obvious to all. But resource/benefit gaps, like hegemony
itself, are relative concepts. Otherwise stated, hegemony exists on
a continuum and is not an either/or condition. A society which
best fits the hegemonic "ideal type" would be one in which those
members classified by the value system as "deserving" would be
seen to be "superior" to the "deserving" members of other socie-
ties which fit the ideal type less well. Conversely, those members
classified as "less deserving" in such a society will be seen to be
"inferior" to their "less deserving" peers in comparison societies
which distribute their resources and benefits more evenly. Valid
comparisons, of course, require comparing the United States with
11. David Livingstone, On Hegemony in Corporate Capitalist States: Material
Structures, Ideological Forms, Class Consciousness, and Hegemonic Acts, 46 Soc. In-
quiry 235 (1976). See also David Sallach, Class Domination and Ideological Hegem-
ony, 15 Soc. Q. 38 (1974), and Mark Wardell & Ellsworth Fuhrman, Controversy
and Ideological Hegemony in Sociological Theory, 22 Soc. Q. 479 (1981).
12. See Sallach, supra note 11, at 40.
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countries with roughly similar political values and levels of devel-
opment; i.e., highly developed industrialized democracies. Thus,
the society best fitting the hegemonic "ideal type," would be simul-
taneously first and last, or nearly so, among nations of the same
general type in areas of social life governed by resource
distribution.
This proposition will be examined in four contexts which are
rarely addressed in the literature of inequality. Specifically, U.S.
performance will be compared with that of other democratic socie-
ties in terms of safety and security in the workplace, medical serv-
ices, education, and sport. In the interest of brevity, income and
wealth distribution and criminal sanctions, areas which are fre-
quently examined in the literature, will not be addressed.1 3
Although reference will be made to relevant Supreme Court deci-
sions when examining the separate areas, a brief overview of the
Supreme Court's role as a major force in the development and per-
petuation of hegemony in the United States is in order.
The Supreme Court and its Role in American Society
It is unnecessary to be more critical of the Founding Fathers
13. We should, however, make some passing comment on these issues. A 1980
study determined that among the top eight industrialized democracies of the world,
only France exceeded the United States in terms of the inequality of income distri-
bution between the highest and lowest income groups in their respective countries.
Henry Reuss, Inequality, Here We Come, Challenge 24, at 50 (1981). Given the im-
pact of the Reagan "reforms" since that time, it is reasonable to speculate that the
U.S. has now surpassed the French income gap. For example, under the Reagan
administration the bottom fifth of the population has lost 7.6% of its income, while
the top fifth has gained 8.7%. Edward S. Greenberg, Capitalism and the American
Political Ideal 193 (1985). In a highly critical paper, Theodore Lowi augments
Greenberg's analysis regarding the widening income gap in the U.S. See Theodore
J. Lowi, Ronald Reagan - Revolutionary?, in The Reagan Presidency and the Gov-
erning of America (Lester M. Salamon & Michael S. Lund eds. 1985).
The Supreme Court consistently asserted its dedication to social inequality in
the latter part of the 19th century and early part of the 20th century by repeatedly
ruling the income tax, the major tool of income redistribution, unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Russell Galloway, The Rich and the Poor in Supreme Court History 1790-
1982 (1982) for an analysis of the Court's attitudes on the issue of the progressive
income tax.
Although the United States has the largest incarceration rate of any demo-
cratic country, Gerald Robin, Introduction to the Criminal Justice System 352 (3d
ed. 1987), and serves up the harshest punishments in the world, Francis Cullen &
Karen Gilbert, Reaffirming Rehabilitation 181 (1981), which fall largely on the
heads of the economically deprived, one may reasonably conclude that the Supreme
Court has been relatively liberal in deciding criminal justice issues. When class
privilege is threatened by challenges to the status quo, however, such as in union
struggles and political dissent, the Court has upheld severe punitive sanctions or-
dered by lower courts. See, e.g., Parenti, supra note 2, at 295-305; Galloway, supra
at 156; and Alan Wolfe, The Seamy Side of Democracy: Repression in America 93-
124 (1973).
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than to say they showed no pronounced enthusiasm for democracy.
The historical record of this period abounds with statements at-
testing to their sentiments, not the least of which was John Jay's
prophetic: "The people who own the country ought to govern it."14
The Founding Fathers distrusted the "empirical," open-ended na-
ture of democracy, and generally held a Calvinist/Hobbesian view
of human nature.' 5 Long before Karl Marx, no less an establish-
ment figure than John Adams recognized the economic foundation
of politics and the nature of the class struggle.' 6
The preeminent issue for Adams, and for the Constitutional
Convention as a whole, was whether people or property should
govern.17 Although there exists voluminous literature debating
the outcome, the left wing of historiography and political science
has tended to view what came out of the Constitutional Conven-
tion as the birth of ideological hegemony in America. Gordon
Wood, commenting on the ideological outcome of the Constitu-
tional Convention, stated:
[T]he cost to the future of American politics was high. By us-
ing the most popular and democratic rhetoric available to ex-
plain and justify their aristocratic system, the Federalists
helped to foreclose the development of an American intellec-
tual tradition in which differing ideas of politics would be un-
timely and genuinely related to differing social
interests .... [Their concept of] democracy in America was no
longer something to be discussed skeptically and challenged
but a faith to which all Americans and all American institu-
tions must unquestioningly adhere.' 8
The evidence is abundant that alternative visions of socio-
political reality have had less of a voice in America than in other
democracies.19 William Ebenstein20 and Seymour Lipset21 are
14. Quoted in Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition 15-16
(1948).
15. As Hofstadter pointed out: "The men who drew up the Constitution in Phil-
adelphia in 1787 had a vivid Calvinistic sense of human evil and damnation and be-
lieved with Hobbes that men are selfish and contentious." Id. at 3. A corollary of
such an image is that human nature is not to be trusted. Since a democracy is the
rule of the people, it follows that democracy is not to be trusted unless limited by
parameters advantageous to men of position and property.
16. See Charles Beard, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy 299-321
(1915).
17. Hofstadter, supra note 14, at 14-17. See also George Woodin, The Shady
Side of America 61 (1974).
18. Gordon Wood, Democracy and the Constitution, in How Democratic is the
Constitution? 17 (Robert Goldwin & William Schambe eds. 1980).
19. Anyone visiting any of the European democracies cannot fail to wonder at
the contrast between the variety of opinions freely available to the common man
there and the meager fare available in the United States. European newsstands
typically offer a wide variety of newspapers covering the political spectrum from
far right to far left. Even in the biggest of U.S. cities, we are offered a choice of two
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among those who have compared the American tolerance for
unorthodoxy and American attitudes about civil liberties with the
attitudes existing in other democracies and found American atti-
tudes trailing. In comparing American attitudes to those of the
British, Ebenstein wrote: "In Britain, there is no special legislation
against communist or fascist groups, no House of Commons Com-
mittee on Un-British Activities, no Internal Security Act, no Sub-
versive Activities Act Control Board ... ,"22 Lipset augments
Ebenstein when he writes: "This concept of 'un-American activi-
ties,' as far as I know, does not have its counterpart in other [dem-
ocratic] countries." 23 Lipset continued, "[Miore than any other
democratic country, the United States makes ideological conform-
ity one of the conditions of good citizenship." 24 It is important to
realize that, while the Supreme Court has often upheld legislation
limiting the free speech of dissidents,25 it has always remained
true to its class colors by never striking down as unconstitutional
any act of Congress limiting such dissident free speech.26
While some theorists assert that there is no significant value
consensus in America2 7 (without bothering to determine to what
extent it does exist relative to other democracies), Michael Mann
believes that hegemony requires only that "those actually sharing
in societal power need develop consistent societal values." 28 Any
lack of value consensus cannot be translated into political action
given the lack of meaningful alternatives in American politics, a
politically similar newspapers at the most, and a host of tabloids revealing the lat-
est fad in diets, love lives of movie stars, and visitors from outer space. In answer-
ing his own rhetorical question-Why wasn't there a revolution in the hungry
thirties?-Robert Hutchins states: "It is a great tribute to the power of the Ameri-
can educational system that nobody had any other ideas. Everybody believed in the
received ideas." Robert Hutchins, In the Thirties, We Were Prisoners of Our Illu-
sions, Are We Prisoners in the Sixties?, N.Y. Times Mag., Sept. 8, 1968, at 49.
20. William Ebenstein, Today's Isms 151 (1967).
21. Seymour Lipset, The Sources of the Radical Right, in The Radical Right 267-
68 (Daniel Bell ed. 1964).
22. Ebenstein, supra note 20, at 173.
23. Lipset, supra note 21, at 267.
24. Id. at 267-68.
25. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 393 (1951). This ruling upholding
the Smith Act essentially outlawed the U.S. Communist Party. The Court upheld
the deportation of any class of aliens, including alien political dissidents, in Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); and in In Re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895), it upheld injunctions preventing collective action by labor movements.
26. Theodore Becker, American Government: Past, Present, Future 81 (1976),
cited in Edward Greenberg, The American Political System: A Radical Approach
357 (1980).
27. See Herbert McClosky, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 361-382 (1964). See also Michael Mann, The Social Cohesion of
Liberal Democracy, 35 Am. Soc. Rev. 423-439 (1970).
28. Mann, supra note 27, at 435.
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lack which is best demonstrated by the abysmal voter turnout in
American national elections relative to the turnout in other
democracies.29
Because of the highly circumscribed political socialization ob-
tained within American schools and from the American media,
Americans do not seem overly concerned with this lack of politi-
cally meaningful alternatives. 30 After all, the most effective way
of maintaining class dominance is not through overt coercion, but
rather "[t]he most effective aspect of hegemony is found in the
suppression of alternative views through the establishment of pa-
rameters which define what is legitimate, reasonable, sane, practi-
pal, good, true, and beautiful."3 '
The power of the judiciary is the keystone to the mainte-
nance of this legitimacy. As Beard pointed out: "The crowning
counterweight to an 'interested and overbearing majority,' as
Madison phrased it, was secured in the peculiar position assigned
to the judiciary, and the use of the sanctity and mystery of the law
as a foil to democratic attacks."32 Like the Grand Inquisitor's
church, the Constitution has been shrouded in a mist of mystery,
myth, and authority. It must be interpreted by those in whom we
have invested esoteric insight, and whose verbal legerdemain ob-
scures the class interests served by them.
As if to underscore his belief that "[t]he people who own the
country ought to govern it,"33 John Jay, given his choice of any
federal office by George Washington, selected the post of Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. He was doubtless aware that from
this commanding office he could best secure the compliance of the
masses with the wishes of the plutocracy so dear to his heart.
From that day forth, the Supreme Court, under a cloak of vacuous
democratic verbiage and ritualism, has done its utmost to preserve
29. Edward Greenberg, The American Political System: A Radical Approach
230 (1980).
30. A number of political socialization studies attest to this circumscription or
"sugarcoating" of American politics. Speaking of history texts, V.O. Key notes:
"Those episodes that redound most to our national glory receive emphasis; and the
picture of the past is deficient in cracks and crevices." V.0. Key, Public Opinion
and American Democracy 317 (1961). Sallach, supra note 11, at 43, concurs that:
"Teachers, as well as texts, insulate children from political conflict and deviant val-
ues or traditions."
31. Sallach, supra note 11, at 41.
32. Beard, supra note 16, at 161. It is difficult to reconcile the idea of judicial
review as expounded by James Madison with the ideals of democracy. As Max Ler-
ner pointed out: "Scratch a fervent believer in judicial supremacy and like as not
you will find someone with a bitterness about democracy. The two are as close as
skin and skeleton." Max Lerner, Ideas are Weapons: The History and Use of Ideas
469 (1939).
33. Hofstadter, supra note 14, at 15.
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the privilege of the class from which its members have come. As
Michael Parenti so well put it:
There is an old saying that the devil himself can quote the Bi-
ble for his own purposes. The Constitution is not unlike the
Bible in this respect, and over the generations Supreme Court
Justices have shown an infernal agility in finding constitu-
tional justification for the continuation of almost every in-
equity and iniquity, be it slavery or segregation, child labor or
the sixteen-hour day, state sedition laws or federal assaults on
the First Amendment. 34
The Court, of course, is not entirely deaf to public opinion. It
eventually overturned its most odious decisions. It has, however,
consistently delayed social legislation designed to benefit the
working classes for decades after similar legislation has been ap-
plied in other democracies.3 5 The Supreme Court Justices, de-
scribed by Fred Rodell as "at once the most powerful and the most
irresponsible of all the men in the world who govern other
men," 36 continue to serve the interests of the elite to the detri-
ment of the non-elite. This article will now explore the conse-
quences of judicially-inspired hegemony within the areas of
workplace safety and security, medical services, education, and
sport.
Safety and Protection for the Elite and Non-Elite
The benefits accruing to the elite in American society are
perhaps nowhere more obvious than in the areas of the security,
safety, and protection of the political elite in relationship to that of
the common man or woman. At the top of American society are
high government officials and their families, political candidates,
and former presidents and their spouses and children, all wrapped
in a protective cocoon by the Secret Service whose primary pur-
pose is protection of these officials. The estimated 1986 budget for
the Secret Service was $283,805,000.37 Taxpayers paid $10.7 million
to protect former presidents Ford, Nixon, and Carter and their
families in 1984,38 and $27 million to cover the cost of candidate
protection during the 1984 elections.39 In comparison to the pro-
tection afforded to U.S. politicians, an article in Time magazine
34. Parenti, supra note 2, at 251.
35. Id. at 268. Cases illustrating Parenti's assertion follow later in this article.
36. Fred Rodell, Nine Men: A Political History of the Supreme Court from 1790
to 1955, at 4 (1955).
37. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 1-S37
(1986).
38. Dropped Guards, Time, March 25, 1985, at 40 [hereinafter Dropped Guards].
39. John Lang, Grueling Campaign for Secret Service Too, U.S. News & World
Rep., Apr. 23, 1984, at 36.
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characterized the protection afforded to the leaders of European
democracies as "threadbare."40
In contrast to this massive financial outlay to protect a hand-
ful of elite citizens, the 1986 budget for the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration [hereinafter OSHA] was $213,859,000,
or approximately $71 million less than that of the Secret Service.41
OSHA ostensibly exists to protect the common worker from the
health and safety risks involved with industrial production, which
are undeniably more hazardous than those associated with the
political life. Unlike the Secret Service, however, OSHA has never
had any real teeth. It is reported that the average fine for a "non-
serious" violation of OSHA codes during the period 1972 through
1974 was $14.99, for serious violations it was $618.66, and for "will-
ful violations" it was $866.44.42
American occupational safety standards are extremely poor
compared with those of other industrialized nations. In the mining
industry alone, Edward Greenberg reported U.S. fatality rates
twice those of West Germany, three times higher than France, and
four times higher than Great Britain.43 This difference is not lim-
ited to fatalities alone. Robert Coles and Harry Huge reported
that the pernicious disease of black lung has been virtually wiped
out in the strictly regulated mines of Western Europe; they quoted
the words of American physician, Dr. Donald Rasmussen, who, af-
ter comparing notes with his British and German colleagues,
stated: "They are doing so much more there, preventively-it's em-
barrassing to compare notes with them. If we really wanted to do
something about 'black lung' we could." 44
The good doctor may have been embarrassed, but evidently
the Supreme Court felt no reason to blush when in 1978 it set
strict limits on OSHA's already feeble enforcement powers in Mar-
shall v. Barlow Inc. ,45 and in 1980 on its already inadequate stan-
dards in Indus. Union Dep't. AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst.
46
40. Dropped Guards, supra note 38, at 40.
41. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 1-017
(1986). The 1986 budget for the Secret Service was $283,805,000. Id. at 1-R33.
42. Dale Beach, Personnel: The Management of People at Work 525 (1985).
43. Greenberg, supra note 29, at 9.
44. Robert Coles & Harry Huge, Black Lung: Mining as a Way of Death, in
Crisis in American Institutions 321 (Jerome Skolnick & Elliot Currie eds. 1970).
45. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). The Court held that an OSHA inspection of business
premises without a seach warrant violates the fourth amendment. The Supreme
Court found that, based on previous experience, requiring warrants to make OSHA
inspections would impose no serious burdens on the inspection system or the
courts. Id. at 311-25.
46. 448 U.S. 607 (1978). OSHA's Secretary had determined that there was a
causal connection between benzene (a toxin) and leukemia (a cancer of the white
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Andrew Szasz viewed these decisions as major victories for the
owner classes in their efforts to further weaken social regulations
in a period of declining working class power.47
Such anti-worker rulings were hardly new, as a small sam-
pling of such rulings made in this century alone will attest. In
Lochner v. New York, 48 for instance, the Court struck down mini-
mum hour legislation as unconstitutionally undermining liberty of
contract. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,49 it struck down antichild-la-
bor legislation on the pretext that the law went beyond Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce. In Adkins v. C7ildren's
Hospital,50 it ruled minimum wage legislation for women and chil-
dren unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled against railroad
worker's pensions in Railroad Retirement Bc v. Alton RR. Co. ,51
and in a series of antiworking class decisions in that same general
period, the Court succeeded in undermining much of President
Roosevelt's efforts to meliorate the effects of the Depression for
the poor.5 2
blood cells), and subsequently reduced the permissible exposure limit on airborne
concentrations of benzene from the consensus standard of 10 parts benzene per mil-
lion parts of air (10 ppm) to 1 ppm. The Secretary also prohibited dermal contact
with solutions containing benzene. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the
standard invalid because it was supported by findings showing it "reasonably neces-
sary or appropriate to provide a safe and healthful employment," as required by
statute. Id. at 611-62. The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that:
"[S]afe" is not the equivalent of "risk-free". There are many activities
that we engage in every day-such as driving a car or even breathing
city air-that entail some risk of accident or material health impair-
ment; nevertheless, few people would consider these activities "un-
safe". Similarly, a workplace can hardly be considered "unsafe" unless
it threatens the workers with a significant risk of harm.
Id. at 642.
47. See Andrew Szasz, The Reversal of Federal Policy Toward Worker Safety
and Health, 50 Sci. & Soc. 25-51 (1986).
48. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
49. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
50. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
51. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
52. The most significant of these anti-working class decisions came in Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). This decision threw out
Roosevelt's National Recovery Act designed ostensibly to increase industrial pro-
duction and put workers back to work. The Court invalidated the Frazier-Lemke
Act which provided for mortgage relief for farmers in Louisville Bank v. Radford,
295 U.S. 555 (1935), and the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which provided price
supports for farmers, in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Commenting on
these and numerous other similar Supreme Court decisions of the New Deal pe-
riod, Robert H. Jackson wrote:
Two kinds of power seem always in competition in our democracy:
there is political power, which is the power of the voters, and there is
the economic power of property, which is the power of the owners.
Conflicts between the two bring much grist to the judicial mill. The
basic grievance of the New Deal was that the Court has seemed un-
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More recently the Court ruled against the workers in Allied
Structural Steel v. Spannaus.53 In the Spannaus case the Court
prohibited the state of Minnesota from requiring companies who
leave the state to insure pension payments to retired Minnesota
employees through the payment of assessments. In National La-
bor Relations Board v. Bildisco,54 it held that companies could uni-
laterally breach collective bargaining contracts with unions
without waiting for rulings from bankruptcy judges if companies
found such contracts to be "burdensome."
One could go on for many pages reciting the litany of the
Court's antiworking class decisions. It is more important, how-
ever, to view them in the context of the working class struggles in
other democracies. As has already been shown, the Supreme
Court successfully delayed proworker legislation for generations
after similar legislation was enacted in European countries.55
The American political elite are also in a favored position vis-
a-vis their counterparts in other democracies in terms of job secur-
ity. The Supreme Court itself is unelected and unaccountable, and
its members enjoy lifetime tenure. No Justice has ever been re-
moved from the Court for any reason, with the exception of Ward
Hunt (1873-1882) who served for five years while mentally incom-
petent until a special law allowed him to retire on full salary.56
One can scarcely imagine a less democratic institution existing in a
democracy, a system of government in which the governed suppos-
edly possess the power to hold decision-makers accountable for
their decisions. 57
duly to favor private economic power and always to find ways of cir-
cumventing the efforts of popular government to control or regulate it.
Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judiciary Supremacy xii (1941).
53. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
54. 465 U.S. 573 (1984).
55. See Parenti, supra note 2, at 311. If, for example, we look at the history of
Great Britain in terms of these issues, we find the Shaftesbury Mines Act of 1842
regulating working conditions in mines, the Ten Hours Bill limiting the working
day of women and children in 1847, and the Trade Union Act of 1871 in which
unions were formally granted legality. See George Trevelyan, A Shortened History
of England 462, 495 (1942). This latter Act came 63 years before the Wagner Act
did the same for American trade unionism in 1934. In the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, the Supreme Court frequently ruled against trade unionists in their bat-
tles to organize and bargain for contracts. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908), and Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
56. Galloway, supra note 13, at 74.
57. There are unelected bodies in other bicameral democracies, but they have
only limited powers. These "upper houses" may delay legislation by sending it back
to the lower house for "second thoughts." Since they are unelected, however, they
cannot make legislation, nor can they void legislation passed by the elected house.
See, e.g., Roy Macridis & Robert Ward, Modern Political Systems: Europe 83 (1968),
for a general discussion of the limits of power placed on unelected parliamentary
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Likewise, the American legislature and executive are rather
firmly entrenched. Unlike their counterparts in parliamentary de-
mocracies, they do not have to face question hours or votes of con-
fidence. Consequently, lacking these formal processes of
accountability, their campaign promises are not taken seriously by
themselves nor by their constituents, unless, of course, these con-
stituents are the monied lobbyists who financed their campaigns.
According to David Livingstone, this lack of reasonable accounta-
bility, and the remoteness from the rest of society that it engen-
ders, is one of the hallmarks of hegemony.5 8
Conversely, the average American worker's hold on his or
her job is extremely tenuous. Lester Thurow stated: "Nowhere in
the world is it easier to fire labor [than in the United States]." 59
The situation has worsened since the Bildisco decision and Rea-
gan's destruction of the Professional Air Traffic Controller's Or-
ganization. Such actions seem unconscionable and barely
imaginable to students of the politics of European democracies. In
stating that the problem of unjust firings in the United States is a
serious one, Dale Beach added: "European nations are ahead of the
United States in providing, by law, protection against unfair dis-
missal." 60 Moreover, most European nations ascribe to the notion
of industrial democracy whereby worker representatives sit on
their companies' boards of directors and take an active part in de-
cision-making.6 1
In the area of occupational protection, safety, and security, it
appears from the evidence adduced that American elites enjoy a
clear-cut superiority over the elites of other democracies, while at
the same time America's ordinary workers are commensurably
worse off than their peers in other democracies.
Medical Attention
In many respects American medicine is the best in the world.
In 1986, the U.S. held the record for the number of Nobel Prizes
won in medicine and physiology; 62 the rich and the powerful from
all over the world head for American hospitals in search of the fin-
upper houses. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has the power to render leg-
islation void by ruling it unconstitutional, thereby engaging in judicial governance.
58. Livingstone, supra note 11, at 239.
59. Lester Thurow, Embattled America: the Struggle for Global Markets, Satur-
day Rev., July 7, 1979, at 20.
60. Beach, supra note 42, at 579.
61. Robert Mathis & John Jackson, Personnel: Contemporary Perspectives and
Applications 469 (1982).
62. Guinness Book of World Records 335 (Norris McWhirter ed. 24th ed. 1986).
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est medical care money can buy. A total of 1,527 foreign nation-
als-which included kings, princes, prime ministers, and other
dignitaries-from seventy four different countries received treat-
ment at the Cleveland Clinic in 1983.63 It must be assumed that
these dignitaries were referred by their own physicians, a rather
clear indication of a medical grassroots consensus that the medical
attention available to the elite in America is the world's best.
As opposed to the excellent care provided to those who can
afford it, "[a]t any point in time, over 25 million Americans have
no health insurance coverage from private health insurance plans
or public programs.... [S]uch individuals can be and are turned
away from hospitals even in emergency situations." 64 The lack of
insurance coverage is not evenly distributed across class lines:
"The poor are twice as likely to be uninsured as the middle class
and three times as likely as those in the upper income groups." 65
Donald Light stated that "[ojnly the United States among in-
dustrialized nations does not provide financial coverage for medi-
cal services used by its citizens. Only the United States takes such
a punitive approach to care for the poor."66 The uneven distribu-
tion of medical services in the United States is reflected in infant
and maternal mortality rates. Among sixteen industrialized de-
mocracies, only Belgium, Italy, and New Zealand show higher in-
fant mortality rates than the U.S.67 None of these comparison
nations had a worse record than the U.S. in terms of maternal
deaths.68 What is shameful about these statistics is not the quality
of American medical attention, but rather the highly skewed way
that the available care is distributed among the "deserving" and
the "non-deserving."
As bad as the situation has been for the poor, it is destined to
get worse under the Reagan administration's peculiar reimburse-
ment system called Diagnostically Related Groups [hereinafter
DRG's].69 Under this system of cost containment, the poor are in-
63. Judy Tarjanyi, Cleveland Clinic Renowned for Royal Treatment, Toledo
Blade, Apr. 19, 1984, at 1, col. 4-5.
64. Karen David & Diane Rowland, Uninsured and Underserved" Inequalities
of Health Care in the United States, in The Sociology of Health and Illness 250 (Pe-
ter Conrad & Rochelle Kern eds. 1986).
65. Id. at 255.
66. Donald Light, Comparing Health Care Systems: Lessons from East and
West Germany, in The Sociology of Health and Illness 429 (Peter Conrad &
Rochelle Kern eds. 1986).
67. U.N. Demographic Y.B., U.N. sales No. E/F. 86. XIII.1 at 364.
68. Id. at 370.
69. DRG's are patient groups that are related by similar diagnoses. They class-
ify patients as similarly situated if they are diagnosed with the same disease with-
out consideration of other factors, such as severity of symptomology and time of
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creasingly being turned away from proprietary hospitals, a situa-
tion which Avedis Donabedian termed "morally reprehensible." 70
He went on to state that there are many who are not concerned
with the disparity of medical care available to the rich and the
poor, "some who, in fact, have advocated a two-tier system of
health care."7 1 Of course, there has always been a two-tier system
of health care. Now, however, it is being openly advocated as a
proper and desirable state of affairs.
Despite this situation, and despite the litany of outrageous
medical bills, bankruptcies, and needless deaths recited in the 1972
Senate Health Subcommittee hearings,7 2 the Supreme Court has
never heard a case in which the access to medical treatment as a
right for all citizens was an issue.7 3 Perhaps this is not too surpris-
ing in a society which believes strongly in the role of the market
place, and which views both wealth and poverty as functions of
personal merit.74
onset or duration. DRG's emphasize hospital profitability and staffing costs per pa-
tient classification level. The general consensus in the medical literature is that
DRG's have made hospitals more efficient and profitable, but they have also re-
sulted in the lessening of the quality and quantity of patient care, poor nursing staff
morale, and patients being admitted to hospitals later than they should be and be-
ing released before they should be. See generally Avedis Donabedian, Quality,
Cos4 and Cost Containment, 32 Nursing Outlook (1984).
70. Id. at 144.
71. Id. at 143.
72. See generally Edward Kennedy, In Critical Condition: The Crisis in
America's Health Care (1983).
73. An interesting related topic is the attitude of the United States on the issue
of maternal leave. The United States is a signatory to the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The par-
ties involved agreed to "introduce maternity leave with pay or comparable social
benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances."
Monica Townson, Paid Parental Leave, Presentation to the Colloquium on the Eco-
nomic Status of Women in the Labor Market, Montreal, Quebec at 1 (Nov. 26-28,
1984) (on file with Law & Inequality). This was designed to recognize the great im-
portance of infant/mother interaction during the critical period of neurophysiologi-
cal growth. See Anthony Walsh, Neurophysiology, Motherhood, and the Growth of
Love, 17 Human Mosaic 51-60 (1983). Yet, the United States, alone among indus-
trial democracies, does not grant such maternal leave. A case is pending before the
Supreme Court regarding this matter at the time of writing, as is a parental leave
act that would provide for ten weeks of unpaid leave pending in Congress. See
David Bergquist, Who's Bringing Up Baby: The Need for a National Uniform Pa-
rental Leave Policy, 5 Law & Inequality 302 (1987). Of course, only those families
able to get by without the mother's income would be able to take advantage of this,
assuming that it passes. By way of contrast, other industrialized nations already
provide paid leave for up to seven months. See, e.g., Karen Berry, What the U.S.
has to Learn about Women, Ms., July/Aug., 1987, at 165.




As of 1980, the U.S. had won 103 of a total of 200 Nobel Prizes
awarded in science. 75 The yearly announcements of prize winners
in the media since that time has seen American scientists virtually
dominating Nobel Prizes in science. One has only to look at the
number of American-authored citations in any foreign scientific
journal to become aware of the leadership and prestige of U.S. sci-
ence and scientists, and, by extension, those who support and
profit from this leadership. 76 American dedication and support for
excellence and achievement among its intellectual elite, particu-
larly in science, is viewed by Richard Quinney as part of an ideo-
logical effort to advance the privilege of the elite to the detriment
of the non-elite.77
Although American predominance in scientific and techno-
logical education continues, it is clear that its leadership in elite
education is not reflected in the more general educational achieve-
ments of average Americans, who come off rather poorly in inter-
national comparisons. A 1983 U.S. Department of Education study
of nineteen academic tests found that "American [high school] stu-
dents were never first or second and, in comparison with other in-
dustrialized nations, were last seven times."78  A 1985 study
revealed that U.S. students ten to fourteen years of age score
lower in reading skills than their age peer students of eight demo-
cratic comparison nations, 79 and Torsten Husen's study of math
achievement showed American high school students scoring lower
than students from all of his eleven democratic comparison
75. Monte Davis, A Vintage Nobel Year, Discover, Dec. 1980, at 35.
76. For example, the author's informal survey of the most recent issues of six
British scientific journals revealed that 62% of the citations were from works that
were clearly American in origin.
77. Richard Quinney, Critique of Legal Order 12-13 (1974), states:
The modern institutional order finds its legitimation in an ideology
that stresses the rationality of science and technology. A generalized
belief in the importance of controlled scientific-technical progress
gives legitimacy to a particular class-the one that utilizes science and
technology. The extent to which this ideology pervades the whole cud-
ture limits the possibility of emancipation, limits even the perception
of the need for liberation.
78. National Commission on Excellence in Education, U.S. Dept. of Education,
A Nation at Risk 8 (1983).
79. James Coleman, International Comparisons of Cognitive Achievement, 66
Phi Delta Kappan 403, 405 (1985). But see Joe Dan Austin, International Study of
Achievement in Mathematics: A Reanalysis, 85 Sch. Sci. & Math. 635 (1985) (aver-
ages for U.S. students are lower than those in seven countries analyzed, but the dif-
ference may be partially attributable to the U.S. educating more secondary school
age children than the others).
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nations.8 0
The poor test performance of American school children rela-
tive to that of foreign school children appears incongruous beside
the spectacular achievement of America's intellectual elite relative
to their foreign peers. It is possible that this wide achievement gap
between the educational elite who win the prizes and the glory for
the United States and the average students who were the subjects
of the above studies is a function of differential motivation. It
would be difficult to explain, however, why the American educa-
tional elite are so much more motivated than their foreign peers
while, at the same time, the average American student is so much
less motivated, without examining the source of this differential
motivation. Motivation flows from perceptions of opportunities
and rewards, and opportunities and rewards are functions of re-
source allocations. 81
The Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to class-based alloca-
tions of educational resources in San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez82 in 1973. The Court held that it was constitutionally
permissible for the state to vary the allocation of educational re-
sources according to the variation of taxable wealth available in
different school districts. The result of this ruling is that signifi-
cant differences in per pupil expenditures exist in rich and poor
districts. The Supreme Court's apparent dedication to social ine-
quality adds credence to Kenneth Clark's statement that "Ameri-
can public schools have become significant instruments in the
blocking of economic mobility and the intensification of class
distinction." 83
Sport and Fitness
It may appear rather incongruous to include the relatively
80. Torsten Husen, Are Standards in US. Schools Really Lagging Behind Those
in Other Countries?, 64 Phi Delta Kappan 455-460 (1983).
81. Motivation is an impetus to action to achieve some goal. In the parlance of
psychology, motivation is a conditioned response to stimuli such as incentives and
inducements. The goal toward which one is motivated must be perceived as a real-
istic possibility for the actor if the motivation is to be maintained. If movements
toward the goal are not adequately reinforced along the way, the motivation will be
extinguished. See generally Roger Ulrich, Marshall Wolfe, & Marland Bluhm, Op-
erant Conditioning in the Public Schools, in Control of Human Behavior 336-39
(Roger Ulrich, Thomas Stachnik, & John Mabry eds. 1970). For our purposes, the
point is that in order to provide motivational reinforcement the incentives have to
be made available in the form of resources. If resources are unevenly distributed so
will motivation be unevenly distributed.
82. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
83. Quoted in Jonathan Kozol, Death at an Early Age, in Crisis in American
Institutions 393 (Jerome Skolnick & Elliot Currie eds. 1976).
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unimportant area of sport and fitness in this analysis. There are
no Supreme Court decisions specifically related to class-based allo-
cations of resources in this area. One could, however, encompass
the allocation of sport and fitness resources under the general bi-
ased allocation of educational resources made possible by the Rod-
riguez decision noted earlier.8 4 Sport and fitness is included to
emphasize the pervasiveness of elitism in the American value
structure.
The results of the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles reflect
the superiority of the United States in the sporting world. The
U.S. won a total of 174 medals, 115 more than its closest rival,
West Germany.8 5 The athletes who performed so well to enhance
the prestige of the United States are the recipients of privileges,
such as university scholarships and expensive training facilities
which are the envy of athletes in other democracies who do not
enjoy them. So, with the possible exceptions of the U.S.S.R. and
East Germany, American athletes sit at the pinnacle of world-class
sports.
In stark contrast to American superiority in sport among the
world's best athletes, the fitness of the average American school
child is abysmal. Glen Kirchner noted that ever since the first
large-scale comparisons of fitness levels between American and
European children were made in 1953, the level of fitness of the
American children was consistently found "[s]ignificantly inferior
to a comparable group of European children."8 6 While there may
be many explanations for the poor showing of American school
children in this area other than an uneven distribution of re-
sources, these explanations would not be able to simultaneously
account for the superb showing of America's top class athletes.
Sport plays "[a] major role in expressing and illustrating our
values."8 7 William Morgan states that "sport supplies specific an-
swers to important ideological questions... in a manner reminis-
cent to some extent of Gramsci's hegemony theory, as a way of
life, a lived consciousness of the various features and aspects of
human life."88 America glorifies the excellence of the talented
few, but "a decent society must provide adequate opportunities for
84. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
85. Olympic Results, Idaho Statesman, Aug. 13, 1984, at 15, col. 1.
86. Glen Kirchner, Physical Education for Elementary School Children 146
(1981).
87. Robert Simon, Sport and Social Values 15 (1985).
88. William Morgan, Review Essay of Sport and Political Ideology, by John
Hoberman, 12 J. Phil. Sport 90 (1985).
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healthy exercise for all its citizens."8 9 The most popular American
sports (e.g., football and basketball) are realistically open only to
those blessed few sitting at the upper extreme of the height and
weight distributions, while we remain relatively unimpressed with
the more physically egalitarian game of soccer, so beloved by the
rest of the world. This, as Morgan pointed out, is another indica-
tion, albeit a relatively innocuous one, of the pervasiveness of the
ethic of providing a disproportionate allocation of resources to the
elite to the detriment of the rest in our schools and colleges. 90
Discussion
A society characterized by the rule of hegemony is one so
structured that the ideas of the ruling class impinge on all its insti-
tutions, both public and private, from top to bottom. Ideologies re-
garding what is right and proper are designed to benefit the class
that define them. This article has shown that America's elite-
whether referring to a political, socio-economic, intellectual, or
sporting elite-receive such a bounty from the American belief
system that they are indeed blessed in comparison to the elites of
other similar nations. By itself, this could be interpreted as being
simply a function of the richness of resources available in the
United States; however, in conjunction with the evidence that
America's disadvantaged (or perhaps simply the "non-elite") are
commensurably worse off than the disadvantaged or non-elites of
the same comparison nations, a different explanation is needed.
The explanation offered here is that the hegemony of the rul-
ing class is more of a reality in America than it is in comparison
nations. Further, the Supreme Court of the United States, remote
and aloof from the people, has played a major role in the develop-
ment and perpetuation of this class ideology. Time and again the
Court has used the Constitution to hammer the lower classes into
ideological submission. It would be difficult to devise a more use-
ful method of achieving ideological conformity than a revered, al-
most holy, document and an untouchable priesthood charged with
interpreting it.
This is not to suggest that the Court generates public atti-
tudes and values in the same way that educational institutions and
the mass media do; rather, the Court perpetuates class hegemony
in its role as the legitimizer and reinforcer of attitudes and values
supportive of the status quo. James Eisenstein pointed out that
89. Simon, supra note 87, at 98.
90. See Morgan, supra note 88, at 91. (The Left is hostile to sport because it
diverts the bougeois' attention from freedom and work).
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the awe and sanctity of the Court assures that its rulings become
"visible to the general public, [and] its beliefs in the myths are re-
inforced." 91 On the other hand, if an idea, value, or attitude be-
comes mobilized and focused by organizations opposed to the class
status quo (e.g., Populists, trade unions, Socialists, Communists)
the Court has illegitimized them by upholding actions by the other
two branches of government aimed at destroying the perceived
threat.9 2
As Quinney pointed out, the real tragedy is that those who
suffer under the hegemonic structure do not even perceive the
need for liberation.93 They continue to salute the flag and cite the
credo of the Founding Fathers with the firm belief that they too
benefit from life in God's country. Americans of all classes seem
to believe that if someone is living in poverty, that person is lazy
and shiftless. If infants and mothers die during the birthing pro-
cess, it is because ignorant mothers neglect prenatal care. If the
poor are turned away from hospitals, it is because they neglected
to insure themselves. If people are injured and killed in unsafe
work environments, they have the freedom to choose to quit. If
children don't learn or lack fitness, they are not motivated or disci-
plined. In short, social problems are individualized and the victim
is blamed for his or her own victimization. Only by blaming vic-
tims of the class structure can the beneficiaries of the same struc-
ture legitimize their privileges as deserved.
The available data demonstrates that the consequences that
one would predict from the presence of a hegemonic class struc-
ture exist in the U.S. As a nation, the U.S. is simultaneously at or
near the top and at or near the bottom in terms of safety and se-
curity in the workplace, medical attention, educational achieve-
ment, and physical achievement in relation to other democratic
industrialized nations. The Supreme Court has legitimized this
hegemonic class structure whenever called upon to do so. It has
used the alchemy of judicial review skillfully to undermine the
march of democracy whenever it has perceived democracy's threat
91. James Eisenstein, Politics and the Legal System 321 (1973).
92. It is interesting to note here how the established order has dealt with polit-
ical third-parties which threatened its rule. Speaking of the unconscionable destruc-
tion of a growing Socialist party in 1919, Charles Dunn writes:
After the Socialists won control of some thirty-two municipal govern-
ments, their headquarters in several cities were ransacked, their funds
confiscated, their leaders jailed, and their newspapers denied mailing
privileges. Some immigrant members were deported. Winning candi-
dates were even denied seats in state legislatures and Congress.
Charles Dunn, American Democracy Debated 262 (1982).
93. See Quinney, supra note 77, at 12-13.
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to privilege. Much more research is needed in the neglected area
of hegemony and of the Supreme Court's role in its perpetuation.
The role of the Supreme Court has been accepted too long as a
value-neutral integral part of American democracy by sociologists
and laypeople alike. An analysis of its historical role does not sup-
port the myth.

